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Fragmented State, Pluralist Society:
How Liberal Institutions Promote Fear
Corey Robin
There are words like Freedom
Sweet and wonderful to say.
On my heartstrings freedom sings
All day everyday.
There are words like Liberty
That almost make me cry.
If you had known what I know
You would know why.
- Langston Hughes, Words Like Freedom
This Article examines the use of fear as an instrument of political repression. By political repression, I mean the use of coercive power to inhibit
or eradicate specific political ideas or movements. Political repression is more
than the neutral application of coercion on behalf of social order. It is coercion applied in a discriminatory fashion, targeting those whose actions or
ideas pose a threat to established arrangements of power and authority. The
aim of repression is not to ensure that laws are followed but that the powerful
are obeyed.' In using fear to repress, the agents of repression intend to do
more than simply coerce one dissenting individual or group; they aim to send
a message to anyone else who may be considering a challenge to established
power and authority-that if she speaks up or acts out, she too will become
the victim of coercion. The instruments of coercion that arouse fear are various: legal bans on particular kinds of speech, legal proscriptions of groups
and parties, harassment and surveillance, onerous regulations, economic sanctions, political trials, imprisonment, and state violence or state-sanctioned
private violence. And what we find in the United States is that it only takes a
little bit of coercion to produce a great deal of fear.
Among analysts who have considered repressive fear, there is a strong
consensus about the type of political structure that arouses it: a centralized,
unified state monopolizing the means of coercion, which crushes a pluralist,
independent, autonomous civil society and leaves men and women with no
countervailing forms of power to resist the state. If the state is decentralized
* Corey Robin is an assistant professor of political science at Brooklyn College
and the Graduate Center of the City University of New York. He is the author of
FEAR: THE HISTORY OF A POLITICAL IDEA (2004), from which this Article is adapted.
1. ROBERT JUSTIN GOLDSTEIN, POLITICAL REPRESSION IN MODERN AMERICA:
FROM 1870 TO THE PRESENT xvi-xxi (1978).
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and fragmented-limited by the separation of powers, federalism, and the
rule of law-and if civil society is allowed to flourish as an independent and
pluralist alternative to the state, repressive fear will be limited, if not eliminated altogether. This line of argument includes realist theorists of the state
like Bodin, Hobbes, Weber, and Skocpol, as well as liberal theorists like
Locke, Montesquieu, Tocqueville, and their twentieth-century exponents.
In this Article, I would like to challenge this way of thinking about repressive political fear. Though elites and their collaborators often use the state
to arouse repressive fear, that state is not necessarily the one described by
Hobbes and his realist successors or by Locke and his liberal successors. It
need not be lawless, centralized, or unified, monopolizing the means of coercion. It can be fragmented by the separation of powers and federalism, and
constrained by the rule of law, conforming to the most basic strictures of our
constitutional faith. The agents of repressive fear also work through pluralist,
2. For realist theorists of repression, fear, and the state, see
BOOKS OF THE COMMONWEALTH

(1967);

JOHN

A.

HALL

& G.

JEAN BODIN, SIX

JOHN IKENBERRY, THE

9-15, 95-100 (1989); THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 110-11, 120-21, 124-25,
127, 223, 225, 228 (Richard Tuck ed., 1991); STEPHEN D. KRASNER, DEFENDING THE
NATIONAL INTEREST: RAW MATERIALS INVESTMENTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
STATE

(1978);

GIANFRANCO POGGI, THE STATE: ITS NATURE, DEVELOPMENT AND PROSPECTS
THEDA SKOCPOL, STATES AND SOCIAL REVOLUTIONS: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FRANCE, RUSSIA, AND CHINA 22, 29-30 (1979); 2 MAX
WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY ch. 9 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1968); 3
id. at chs. 10, 13; Quentin Skinner, The State, in POLITICAL INNOVATION AND

5, 8-9, 13, 19-23 (1990);

CONCEPTUAL CHANGE 90 (Terence Ball et al. eds., 1989); Theda Skocpol, Bringing
the State Back In: Strategies ofAnalysis in Current Research, in BRINGING THE STATE
BACK IN 3, 9 (Peter B. Evans et al. eds., 1985); Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in
FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 77, 78-80 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills
eds., 1946). For liberal and conservative theorists of fear, repression, and the state,
which include some version of these arguments, see 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE
PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 254-57 (1991) [hereinafter ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE];
AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 6-7, 123
(1998); ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS?: DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN

AMERICAN CITY (1961); JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, DEMOCRACY ON TRIAL 38-39, 4243, 45-52 (1995); THE FEDERALIST PAPERS (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987); MILTON
FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 3 (2002); LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF
LAW 40 (1964); JOHN GRAY, POST-LIBERALISM: STUDIES IN POLITICAL THOUGHT 158

(1993); F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 21, 137, 142, 185 (1960); JOHN
LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., 1988); MONTESQUIEU,

THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (Anne M. Cohler et al. eds., 1989); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY
OF JUSTICE 58, 239-41 (1971); CHARLES TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS 22,
204-05, 214 (1995); Bruce Ackerman, The Political Casefor Constitutional Courts,
in LIBERALISM WITHOUT ILLUSIONS: ESSAYS ON LIBERAL THEORY AND THE POLITICAL

VISION OF JUDITH N. SHKLAR 205, 212-13, 215-16 (Bernard Yack ed., 1996) [hereinafter Ackerman, Political Case]; Judith N. Shklar, The Liberalism of Fear, in
LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE 21 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 1989) [hereinafter
Shklar, The Liberalism of Fear].
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autonomous institutions of civil society-schools and churches, private associations and the family, civic groups and political organizations, and the
workplace-where they find a sizeable armory of repressive weapons. These
weapons are seldom as physically coercive as those possessed by the state.
Indeed, most are fairly non-violent: firing; blacklisting; denials of promotion
and economic opportunity; ostracism; exclusion or expulsion from favored
circles of intimates, associates, and friends; and everyday forms of humiliation and degradation. Because the Constitution makes it difficult for the state
to wield weapons of fear with abandon, elites often rely upon these weapons
of civil society, which are not subject to much constitutional restraint. We
best approach the distinction between state and society, then, as a division of
labor or joint venture between the public and private sectors: What government officials cannot do well or with efficient ease, private elites do instead,
and vice versa.
I focus here on the downsides of the fragmented state and social pluralism. Readers may wonder about their upsides: Don't the separation of powers
and the rule of law forestall fear? Don't federalism and social pluralism give
people opportunities for resistance? They do. I don't discuss their positive
effects here because many scholars have written about them elsewhere. But
there is another reason to dwell on the negative effects of the fragmented state
and social pluralism. All too often in the United States, we assume that repressive fear arises outside our political system, beyond the Constitution and
institutions of civil society. Trying to understand an instance of repressive
fear, we assume that federalism and the separation of powers must have
failed, or that the rule of law has been defeated, as if everything designed to
support freedom must stand on one side of the fence and everything designed
to arouse fear on the other. When it comes to problems like pollution or poverty, we know that the world is not black and white. But when the issue is
repressive fear, and the venue is the United States, we assume that a force for
good cannot also be a force for ill. I would like to take a different tack, to see
how constituent elements in the American polity can be both instruments of
freedom and weapons of fear. Because it suggests that our solutions are also
our problems, such an inquiry does not yield easy or simple remedies. Indeed,
it only produces paradoxes and incongruities. But such puzzles need not
dampen our spirits, for as philosophers discovered long ago, perplexity is
often the beginning of wisdom.
I. FRAGMENTED STATE

Inspired to a great degree by Montesquieu, the authors of the United
States Constitution believed that a unified and, to a lesser degree, centralized
state posed a threat to freedom. Regardless of who wielded it on whose behalf, government power, indivisible and concentrated, was an invitation to
political repression. "The accumulation of all powers

. . .

in the same hands,"
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wrote James Madison, is "the very definition of tyranny." 3 So the Framers
placed in the Constitution three obstacles: the separation of powers, federalism, and the rule of law. They divided the national government into three
branches, and the legislative branch into two houses. They created a federalist
structure of national and state governments, to which we may add local and
county governments. And though the rule of law is not an explicit provision
of the Constitution, its components appear so often throughout-from the
enumeration of congressional powers to the due process clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments-that we can include it as a constituent element.
Whatever the nationalist aspirations of the Framers, there can be no doubt
that the Constitution fragments the state in order to check the repressive ambitions of tyrants old and new.
A. The Separation of Powers
In prescribing the separation of powers as a remedy for government tyranny, Madison and the Framers propounded a simple logic: grant independent
power to the different branches of government, and each member of that
branch will have a personal interest in maintaining that power and preventing
the other branches from carrying out their repressive designs. Though each
branch can and does influence the other-the Constitution mandates not just a
separation but also a mingling of powers-the possession of independent
power ensures that officials in one branch have, in the words of Madison,
"personal motives to resist encroachments [from] the others, 'A or to cooperate
with only those schemes not malignant to the commonweal. 5 The two options, then, available to a government of separated powers are stalemate born
of attempted repression or cooperation born of benign intent. In the words of
the Supreme Court, "if government power is fractionalized, if a given policy
can be implemented only by a combination of legislative enactment, judicial
application, and executive implementation,
no man or group of men will be
6
able to impose its unchecked will."

3. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 303 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed.,
1987). See also BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 272-301 (1967); JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND
IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 244-87 (1996); GORDON S. WOOD, THE
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 150-61, 446-53, 547-53, 602-06

(1969).
4. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 319 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed.,
1987).
THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10, 51 (James Madison).
6. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 443 (1965). See also HAYEK, supra

5.

note 2, at 185; 1 LAURENCE H.TRIBE,
2000).

AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 122 (3d ed.
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There is much to recommend this logic, and historical experience demonstrates that it has often held sway.7 But granting independent power to different branches of government also means that small groups within those
branches have significant power at their disposal, which they can use repressively, without consulting the other branches of government-indeed, without
consulting members of their own branches. These occurrences are not failures
of the separation of powers; they are directly attributable to it, for as Madison
observed, if each branch of government did not possess independent power,
how could it check the others or have an investment in checking them? Often
overlooked in the grant of independent power, then, is just how coercive that
power can be and how small a constituency is required to use it repressively.
Tiny outposts of state intimidation, these forms of independent power can
pose a considerable threat to dissenters and potential dissenters.
Consider those famous congressional committees investigating communist infiltration and leftist subversion during the McCarthy era. Many legislative committees mounted such investigations, but three were particularly important: the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC), the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, and the Senate Permanent Investigations
Subcommittee. Though authorized by legislative majorities, these committees
were very much the work of small minorities. Because committee chairs were
chosen by seniority, they were seldom controlled by or accountable to party
majorities. Despite procedural constraints, they were free to manage their
committees as they saw fit, launching investigations and calling witnesses
without informing other committee members. Traditions of senatorial privilege also dictated that party leaders not interfere with individual committees
and their chairs. In both houses, committee chairs were able to manipulate
congressional rules in order
to mount intrusive investigations of the executive
8
branch and civil society.
Congressional committees possess two instruments of coercion, which
can be wielded without consent of the other branches of government. Brandishing the weapon of "prescriptivepublicity,"9 congressional committees put
uncooperative witnesses-as well as their families and friends-under an
embarrassing spotlight, exposing them to public obloquy and political stigma.
In 1954, for instance, Sylvia Bernstein, a leftist in Washington and mother of
7. Cf

DAVID

R.

MAYHEW,

LAWMAKING, AND INVESTIGATIONS,

DIVIDED

WE

GOVERN:

1946-1990 (1991);

INQUEST: THE STORY OF CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS

PARTY

CONTROL,

TELFORD TAYLOR, GRAND

(1955).

8. WALTER GOODMAN, THE COMMITTEE: THE EXTRAORDINARY CAREER OF THE
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES 168-69 (1968); ROBERT GRIFFITH,
THE POLITICS OF FEAR: JOSEPH R. MCCARTHY AND THE SENATE 58, 89, 104-13, 206-

07, 210-12, 303-04 (2d ed. 1987). See also DAVID W. ROHDE, PARTIES AND LEADERS
IN THE POSTREFORM HOUSE 4-5 (1991); Nelson W. Polsby, The Institutionalizationof
the US. House of Representatives,62 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 144 (1968).
9.

EARL LATHAM, THE COMMUNIST CONTROVERSY IN WASHINGTON: FROM THE

NEW DEAL TO MCCARTHY

381 (1966).
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future Watergate journalist Carl Bernstein, was called before HUAC. 10 When
her attorney asked HUAC's chair to instruct a newspaper photographer to
stop taking pictures of the session, the chair responded, "News photographers
have a perfect right, especially in cases where the witness refuses to give any
information, a perfect right to take their pictures ..... .. Publicity, in other
words, was a punishment for the uncooperative witness-and a threat to other
uncooperative witnesses. The next day, the Washington Post ran Bernstein's
photograph under the front-page headline, "Red Party 'Hard Core' in Capital,
Velde Says."'1 2 Such negative publicity invariably followed the witness to her'
neighborhood, to her friend and family circles, and to her workplace, from
which she could be fired. Bernstein's daughter was thrown out of nursery
school, relatives ceased all communication with the family, and friends of the
children were forbidden to associate with them. 13 That hounding, as a 1948
HUAC report intimated, was one of the purposes of its hearings:
"to permit American public opinion... an... opportunity to render a continuing verdict on all of its public officials and to evaluate
the merit of many in private life who either openly associate with
and assist disloyal groups or covertly14 operate as members or fellow-travellers of such organizations."
Congressional committees can also threaten uncooperative witnesses
with contempt citations or potential charges of perjury. Between 1857 and
1949, Congress cited only 113 witnesses for contempt; between 1950 and
1952, however, it cited 117.15 And while contempt citations require the collaboration of the courts in order to yield prison sentences, their mere threatwhich Congress wields on its own---can be enough to persuade witnesses to
testify and to cease their leftist associations. In 1951, for instance, actor Larry
Parks was called before HUAC.16 Asked to name names, he capitulated, bearing painful witness to the effects of a threatened contempt citation: "Don't
present me with the choice," he said, "of either being in contempt of this
Committee and going to jail or forcing me to really crawl through the mud to

10. CARL BERNSTEIN, LOYALTIES: A SON'S MEMOIR 33

(1989).

11. Id. at 105 (emphasis added).
12. Id. at 113.
13. Id. at 115-16, 118-21.
14. LATHAM, supra note 9, at 381 (quoting Report of House Committee on UnAmerican Activities, Aug. 27, 1948) (alteration in original).
15. DAVID CAUTE, THE GREAT FEAR: THE ANTI-COMMUNIST PURGE UNDER TRUMAN AND EISENHOWER 96 (1978).

16.
(1998).

ELLEN SCHRECKER, MANY ARE THE CRIMES: MCCARTHYISM IN AMERICA

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss4/11
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'7
be an informer. For what purpose? I don't think this is a choice at all.'
Fifty-eight of the subsequent 110 Hollywood
witnesses HUAC called that
8
spring made the same choice as Parks.'
Madison's argument that the possession of independent power inspires
government officials to check each other's repressive policies also overlooks
another possible outcome. The investment in the power of one's own branch
can inspire officeholders to implement those policies themselves, if for no
other reason than to keep intruders from the other branches out of their domain. In March 1947, for example, President Harry Truman issued Executive
Order 9835, which launched investigations of every federal employee for
signs of political subversion, and authorized the firing and refusal to hire of
anyone suspected of communist sympathies.19 More than any single government policy, EO 9835 chilled the political air, making it difficult to sustain
leftist views without fear of sanction. Truman was not eager to issue this order.20 Convinced that the threat of communist infiltration of the government
had been overstated and could easily be contained by less repressive measures, he worried that EO 9835 would only empower the FBI, which he likened to the Gestapo and the NKVD. 21 Though historians still disagree about
why Truman issued it, one of his motivations was to protect the executive
branch from congressional intrusion. 22 In early 1946, congressional Republicans had warned that if they won the midterm election in November, they
would conduct, in the words of one Kansas representative, "an immediate and
thorough housecleaning" of the executive branch.23 Fearing that members of
24
Congress wanted to "join in the administration of the loyalty program,"
Truman decided that the executive branch should police its own employees,
thereby keeping congressional investigators at bay. As much as it may inspire
resistance between the branches, the impulse to maintain autonomy can also
inspire cooperation between those branches.

17. THIRTY YEARS OF TREASON: EXCERPTS FROM HEARINGS BEFORE THE HOUSE

COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES, 1938-1968, at

333 (Eric Bentley ed.,

1971).

18.

SCHRECKER, SUpra note 16, at 329.
19. Exec. Order No. 9835, 12 Fed. Reg. 1935 (Mar. 21, 1947); see also CAUTE,
supra note 15, at 25-29; GRIFFITH, supra note 8, at 40-43, 90-93; ALAN D. HARPER,
THE POLITICS OF LOYALTY: THE WHITE HOUSE AND THE COMMUNIST ISSUE, 19461952, at 23-25 (1969); LATHAM, supra note 9, at 364-66.

20. ALONZO L. HAMBY, MAN OF THE PEOPLE: A LIFE OF HARRY S. TRUMAN 427-

29 (1995).

21. CURT GENTRY, J. EDGAR HOOVER: THE MAN AND THE SECRETS 319 (1991);
HAMBY, supra note 20, at 429; 2 MEMOIRS BY HARRY S. TRUMAN 1946-52: YEARS OF

TRIAL AND HOPE 273 (1956).
22. CAUTE, supra note 15, at 27; SCHRECKER, supra note 16, at 209.

23.

RICHARD M. FREELAND, THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE AND THE ORIGINS OF

MCCARTHYISM 120-21 (1985).
24. 2 MEMOIRS BY HARRY S. TRUMAN, SUpra note 21, at 281.
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B. Federalism
Though federalism was the Framers' more or less unhappy brainchild,25
its conservative proponents often uphold its "counterintuitive" assumption
that "freedom," in the words of Justice Kennedy, is "enhanced by the creation
of two governments, not one. ' 26 Since the Civil War, most liberal jurists and
writers have been suspicious of federalism, seeing in its celebration of state
and local rights a defense of slavery and Jim Crow, as well as opposition to
the New Deal. But more recently, some liberals, including the late Justice
Brennan, have backed away from their opposition to federalism. 27 Though
they remain aware of its covert oppressions, contemporary liberals believe
that federalism gives state governments the opportunity to challenge a conservative national government and ordinary citizens the chance to participate
in local, and presumably more democratic, forums. Today's liberals thus follow Tocqueville, who famously claimed,
Local institutions are to liberty what primary schools are to science; they put it within the people's reach; they teach people to appreciate its peaceful enjoyment and accustom them to make use of
it. Without local institutions a nation may give
itself a free gov28
ernment, but it has not got the spirit of liberty.
In the same way that the separation of powers inspires a vested interest in
checking the power of ambitious tyrants, federalism is supposed to arouse a
desire to work against a centralizing state. "[P]opulism and federalism-25. Federalism, it should be recalled, was a compromise forced upon the Framers. Madison was a nationalist, who conceived of a strong national government as a
check against tyrannical states and localities, as was Hamilton, who thought of the
national government as an instrument of a continental empire. Inspired by these competing nationalist visions, Madison had initially proposed a scheme that ran just shy
of "abolishing the states altogether." RAKOVE, supra note 3, at 169. But loyalty to the
states being what it was, his and Hamilton's aggressive nationalism had to give way.
Id. at 169-70.
26. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 576 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
See also FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 3; HAYEK, supra note 2, at 183-86.
27. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, supra note 2, at 254-57; GEORGE
KATEB, THE INNER OCEAN: INDIVIDUALISM AND DEMOCRATIC

CULTURE

42, 70

(1992); Ackerman, Political Case, supra note 2, at 212-13, 215-16; William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as
Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535 (1986); William J. Brennan,
Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489
(1977). For excellent critiques, see JOHN D. DONAHUE, DISUNITED STATES (1997);
Edward L. Rubin and Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903 (1994).
28. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 63 (George Lawrence
trans., J.P. Mayer ed., 1969).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss4/11

8

2004]

Robin: Robin: Fragmented State, Pluralist Society:
FRAGMENTED STATE, PLURALIST SOCIETY

1069

liberty and localism-work together," writes Akhil Reed Amar. "We the
People conquer government power by dividing it between the two rival governments, state and federal ....
Though the creation of two or more levels of government is supposed to
arouse conflict and check power between the various levels, it also offers
more opportunities for repression-not because state and local governments
are more tyrannical than the federal government, but because state and local
governments often work in tandem with the federal government. Each level
of government replicates what the other levels are already doing or uses its
own particular powers to do what the other levels cannot do. 30 Federalism, in
other words, enables each level of government to duplicate or supplement the
coercion of the other levels, sometimes doubly, even trebly increasing the
coercive burdens borne by any one individual. Each level also influences the
other, with the federal government inspiring in the lower levels the motive
and means to act repressively, and vice versa.
Consider the duplication of the government's coercive measures during
the Cold War. Throughout the late 1940s and 1950s, the federal government
used the Smith Act, which crirninalizes the teaching and advocacy of the violent overthrow of the federal government, to prosecute the Communist Party
leadership in court. 3 1 It also used, as previously mentioned, Executive Order
9835.32 In addition, in 1950, Congress passed, over Truman's veto, the Internal Security Act, which among other provisions mandated that Communist
organizations register with the Attorney General.33 In 1954, Congress passed
the Communist Control Act, outlawing the Communist Party.34 Congress also
fielded, as we have seen, three legislative committees to investigate communist subversion.
Far from challenging these federal programs and policies, state and local
governments mimicked each of them. An estimated 150 municipalities passed
anti-subversion ordinances like the Smith Act; eleven states passed registration statutes similar to the 1950 Internal Security Act; eight states outlawed
the Communist Party.35 By 1967, forty-five states had an anti-sedition law on
their books. 36 Though the Supreme Court in 1956 would strike down one of
29. AMAR, supra note 2, at 123.
30. This is not to be confused with Hayek's contention that federalism requires
both levels of government to work together in order to act coercively. HAYEK, supra
note 2, at 185.
31. Smith Act, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670 (1940); see also 1 THOMAS I. EMERSON ET
AL., POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES

104-06 (3d ed. 1967).

32. See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
33. Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, ch. 1024, 64 Stat. 987; see also 1
EMERSON ET AL., supra note 31, at 157-65.

34. Communist Control Act of 1954, ch. 886, 68 Stat. 775; see also 1 EMERSON
supra note 31, at 198-200.
35. 1 EMERSON ET AL., supra note 31, at 209.
36. Id. at 207.

ET AL.,

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
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these state anti-sedition laws, 37 it later qualified this position by claiming that
38
states could take action against sedition that threatened them individually.
While federalist theory would suggest that Congress would be jealous of any
state effort to preempt its authority, members of Congress were outraged by
the Court's 1956 decision. 39 They repeatedly attempted to pass bills stipulating, in the words of one proposed statute, "[t]hat no act of Congress shall be
construed as indicating an intent on the part of Congress to occupy the field in
which such act operates, to the exclusion of all State laws on the same subject
matter. '4° When this legislation was finally amended to apply only to antisubversion laws, it passed the House but died in the Senate.4 1
Like Congress, thirteen states set up legislative committees with an explicit mandate to investigate subversion; this did not include the myriad other
state legislative committees investigating subversion without such mandates. 42 Some of these state committees preceded their federal counterparts,
clearing the path for later federal efforts. In 1940-41, for instance, New
York's Rapp-Coudert committee investigated communist subversion in New
York City's public schools and colleges, forcing city agencies to fire more
than fifty teachers and professors.43 As if to prove that federalism could pave
a two-way street for repression, Rapp-Coudert investigator Robert Morris
used his experience in New York to catapult himself to the position of chief
counsel to two Senate investigating committees. 44 These Senate committees
also summoned witnesses who testified before Rapp-Coudert and worked
with many of Rapp-Coudert's informants.45
With the exception of anti-sedition laws, state and local governments
most consistently replicated federal programs in the field of public employment. By 1950, thirty-two states barred alleged subversives from working in
government, at times turning the most innocuous posts into the front lines of
national security. 46 As governor of California, Earl Warren signed the 1950
Levering Act, which made every single state employee a "civil defense
worker" and barred alleged subversives from employment. 47 New York State
37. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
38. Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959); see also 1 EMERSON
note 31, at 219.
39. 1 EMERSON ET AL., supra note 31, at 217.
40. Id. at 218.
41. Id.
42. See

CAUTE,

ET AL.,

supra

supra note 15, at 80; RICHARD M. FRIED, NIGHTMARE IN RED:
104-13 (1990); SCHRECKER, supra note 16, at

THE MCCARTHY ERA IN PERSPECTIVE

97.
43.

SCHRECKER,

supra note 16, at 97; ELLEN W.
75-83 (1986).

SCHRECKER, No IVORY TOWER:

MCCARTHYISM AND THE UNIVERSITIES

44. See SCHRECKER, supra note 43, at 77.
45. FRIED, supra note 42, at 105.
46. CAUTE, supra note 15, at 339.
47. Id. at 341.
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defined all of the following as security-sensitive government positions not
open to alleged subversives: scientists in the paleontology division of the
Department of Education ("they have knowledge concerning the location of
caves and their suitability for defense storage purposes"); sanitation workers
in New York City ("disease might spread in the event that department did not
perform its duty"); and probation workers in the city's Domestic Relations
Court.48 States also had employees take loyalty or test oaths, swearing that
they were not, would not be, and had never been, subversive.4 9 Some of these
oaths, like Oklahoma's, required individuals to swear that they would not
advocate "a change in the form of government" not just by force or violence
but also by any "unlawful means." 50 By 1967, thirty-two states required loyalty or test oaths, with an additional five requiring them of public school
teachers and university professors. 5' All told, 70 to 75 percent of
52 the nation's
state and local employees worked in states requiring such oaths.
States not only copied one another; they also attempted to outdo one another by leveraging their ever more particular powers against dissenters. At
the height of the McCarthy years, states like Ohio denied unemployment
compensation to those advocating the violent overthrow of the government
and required applicants for benefits to file affidavits regarding their beliefs on
such matters. 53 California denied honorably discharged veterans property-tax
exemptions granted to all other veterans if they refused to take a loyalty
oath. 54 The City of Los Angeles even denied constitutionally mandated property-tax exemptions to churches refusing to take the oath. 55 In 1969, a government commission found that local police departments used their power not
as a neutral force for law and order but as a way to channel conservative
political imperatives. 56 Police officers saw "students, other anti-war protestors
and blacks as a danger to our political system [and] themselves as the political force by which57 radicalism, student demonstrations and black power
[could] be blocked.,

48.

RALPH

S.

BROWN, JR., LOYALTY AND SECURITY: EMPLOYMENT TESTS IN THE

106-07 (1958).
49. Id. at 92-93, 169, 181; 1 EMERSON ET AL., supra note 31, at 395-96.
50. BROWN, JR., supra note 48, at 96-97.
51. 1 EMERSON ET AL., supra note 31, at 395.
52. See BROWN, JR., supra note 48, at 178.
53. 1 EMERSON ET AL., supra note 31, at 306.
54. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 516 (1958); see also 1 EMERSON ET AL.,
supra note 31, at 286-92.
55. First Unitarian Church v. County of Los Angeles, 357 U.S. 545, 546 (1958);
see also 1 EMERSON ET AL., supra note 31, at 292.
56. THE COINTELPRO PAPERS: DOCUMENTS FROM THE FBI's SECRET WARS
AGAINST DISSENT IN THE UNITED STATES 217 (Ward Churchill & Jim Vander Wall
eds., 2d ed. 2002).
57. Id.
UNITED STATES
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During the Cold War, state and local governments also turned their licensing procedures into instruments of political intimidation. Texas required
pharmacists to take an oath that they did "not believe in" the overthrow of the
American government through "illegal or unconstitutional methods. ' 8 In
Washington, D.C., insurance sales representatives were required to answer
questions about their membership in the Communist Party and any of the
59
other 197 political organizations proscribed by the Attorney General's list.
They had to disclose whether they had refused, for constitutional reasons, to
answer questions put to them by a court or other government tribunal. 6° Politically driven licensing procedures often provided occasions of surreal comedy, with local officials costuming themselves as soldiers in a great pageant
of national security. Indiana's Athletic Commission, for instance, insisted that
professional wrestlers and boxers take loyalty oaths, while New York denied
anyone refusing to take an oath permits to fish in the city's reservoirs. 61 Most
men and women could forego the right to fish, but what were leftist lawyers
to do in the five states where they were required to take such oaths, or in the
nearly twenty states where they were asked questions about their loyalty?
Questions could range from, "Do you belong to or have you attended the
meetings of any group which advocates any theory or 'Ism' which would
prevent you from taking the ... oath wholeheartedly," to whether applicants
be eligible to practice law, to "Did you vote for
thought Communists should
"
Henry Wallace in 1948? ,62
Whether acts of state and local repression are duplicates or substitutes
for federal repression, their federalist character makes political fear a denser,
more socially repressive enterprise. Struggles in this country over civil rights,
labor unions, and social progress have always had a local dimension, and
state and local coercion has figured prominently in their suppression. In
Houston, real estate magnates used repressive anticommunism to stop antizoning legislation; in California, conservative politicians used it to go after
sex education in the schools. Throughout the South and the Midwest, government officials and economic elites used anticommunism to fight civil
rights. The Alabama Citzens Council declared, "The attempt to abolish segregation in the South... is fostered and directed by the Communist Party," and
several southern states put this theory into practice. 63 Wielding their power in
the name of national security, they outlawed the NAACP, forced it and other
civil rights organizations to hand over their membership lists to state investigating committees, and indicted civil rights leaders for sedition. 64 Federalism
1 EMERSON ET AL., supra note 31, at 313.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 313-14.
62. BROWN, JR., supra note 48, at 110-12.
63. SCHRECKER, supra note 16, at 391-94.
64. Id. at 393-94.
58.
59.
60.
61.
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thus allows local and state elites to customize repressive fear, to use it on
behalf of their own peculiar concerns.
Federalism can also make efforts to roll back or resist politically repressive fear more difficult. Not only does federalism force the resisters to fight
their battles on multiple fronts, but it also enhances the obscurity and isolation of small towns and specific states. By distributing institutions of state
coercion to nooks and crannies around the country, by circling them with a
protective cordon against federal intrusion, federalism shields local and state
elites from national publicity and oversight. We often remember the spotlight
the national media put on the violent confrontations in Birmingham between
civil rights demonstrators and Bull Connor's fire hoses and police dogs. But
for every Birmingham, there is a forgotten hamlet, overlooked state legislative subcommittee, or obscure local ordinance which garners no publicity,
receives no attention. This same criticism could be applied to the federal government: How many reports from a congressional committee can one journalist read? How many administrative regulations can one activist keep track of?.
The key difference is that centralized government offers a more geographically concentrated, politically coherent target for resistance and opposition;
federalism scatters these targets to the wind.
C. The Rule ofLaw
By the rule of law, I refer only to those procedures that limit and regulate the exercise of government power.65 Political fear, many claim, is
aroused by arbitrary, unpredictable government power subject to no legal
constraint. When rulers are free to do as they will, the ruled cannot possibly
know which of their actions will or will not incur government sanctions. Such
uncertainty, the argument goes, creates political fear in its purest form. Uncertain subjects are not, and cannot be, free because they are perpetually inse-

65. For some scholars, reducing the rule of law to "the law of rules" - that is, to
mere procedures - misses the aspirations of the law: its commitment to robust individual rights, its moral vision of fairness and equity. The rule of law, these scholars
claim, contains substantial principles of justice, a higher law if you will. By restricting
myself to the procedural, I do not mean to suggest that the rule of law excludes these
substantive claims. Indeed, I am quite sympathetic to interpretations that highlight
them, and agree that the strictly procedural often contains, at least implicitly, substantive principles of justice. I only focus here on the procedural because it is law's procedures, according to many writers, that preclude or make difficult rule by fear. For
procedural interpretations, see JOSEPH RAZ,

THE

AUTHORITY

OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW

AND MORALITY 210-29 (1979); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules,
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989). For more substantive interpretations, see RONALD
DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 9-28 (1985); RAWLS, supra note 2, at 58; JUDITH

N.

SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS

39-47, 120-23 (1964).
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cure about their lives and liberties. 6 6 But when rulers are constrained by the
rule of law, the argument continues, subjects know the perimeter of legitimate
action. They see bright "no trespassing" signs and confine themselves to the
interior. By generating secure expectations in the population, the rule of law
substantially minimizes the fear aroused by unpredictable exercises of government power. "Knowing what things [the law] penalizes and knowing that
these are within their power to do or not to do," explains Rawls, "citizens can
draw up their plans accordingly. One who complies with the announced rules
need never fear an infringement of his liberty." 67 Because the rule of law
requires the threat of punishment, it cannot eliminate all fear. But when the
fear of punishment is firmly attached to a finite set of infractions, the argument concludes, its objects are limited, its emotive qualities less intense and
paralyzing. By upholding the rule of law, moreover, this fear of punishment
minimizes the immobilizing dread born of lawlessness or arbitrary power. 6 8 A
rule-bound polity may create injustice and unfairness-imposing uniform
duties across the population, as did Jim Crow's rules of racial segregation,
regardless of their deleterious impact upon specific groups or individualsbut it cannot generate a fear-ridden society.
Taken on its own terms, this account makes some sense. As I will argue
below, the McCarthy era was limited by the rule of law, and one finds in the
memoirs of and about the time little of the trembling paralysis that theorists
of the rule of law seek to avoid. Political options may have been constricted,
but men and women were not uncertain about the limits of legitimate con66. "Freedom of Men under Government," writes Locke, entails among other
things "not to be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, Arbitrary Will of
another Man." LOCKE, supra note 2, 11.22, at 284. According to Rawls, if laws are
"vague and imprecise, what we are at liberty to do is likewise vague and imprecise.
The boundaries of our libert[ies] are uncertain. And to the extent that this is so, liberty
is restricted by a reasonable fear of its exercise." RAWLS, supra note 2, at 239. Hayek
claims that:
The coercion which a government must still use ... is reduced to a minimum and made as innocuous as possible by restraining it through known
general rules, so that in most instances the individual need never be coerced unless he has placed himself in a position where he knows he will
be coerced. Even where coercion is not avoidable, it is deprived of its
most harmful effects by being confined to limited and foreseeable duties,
or at least made independent of the arbitrary will of another person.
HAYEK, supra note 2, at 21. When "there is a general and drastic deterioration in
legality," argues Fuller, "the principal object of government seems to be, not that of
giving the citizen rules by which to shape his conduct, but to frighten him into impotence." FULLER, supra note 2, at 40. What the rule of law seeks to prevent, writes
Shklar, is fear "created by arbitrary, unexpected, unnecessary, and unlicensed acts of
force." Shklar, The Liberalism ofFear, supra note 2, at 29.
67. RAWLS, supra note 2, at 241. See also HAYEK, supra note 2, at 21, 142.
68.

HAYEK,

supra note 2, at 21, 137, 142;

RAWLS,

supra note 2, at 240-41;

Shklar, The Liberalism ofFear,supra note 2, at 29.
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duct. The problem with this account is that predictability can also obtain in
societies where no one would doubt that repressive fear governs. During the
Soviet purges of the late 1930s, writes Anne Applebaum, it was not easy "to
predict with any certainty who would be arrested," but "it became possible to
guess who was likely to be arrested., 69 This hardly made Stalin's persecutions
just or reasonable, but it did make them somewhat foreseeable. Foreigners,
for example, were a suspect category so "most ordinary Soviet citizens...
worked out the pattern, and wanted no foreign contacts at all.",70 Telling or
listening to jokes about Stalin-not to mention speaking against hinm--was
also suspect so men and women learned to stay away from such talk.7'
Though this litany of crimes was remote from any reasonable definition of
justice,72 it was finite. And though it was arbitrary in the sense that men and
women could be punished for acts that would never be considered crimes
under any coherent definition of the rule of law, it was not arbitrary in the
sense held to matter most: It was not irregular.
Repressive regimes may conform to routines, theorists of the rule of law
will respond, but how can one square the rule of law with the titanic violence
and countries of walking dead over which these regimes preside? The rule of
law is supposed not only to regulate, but also to limit, state power. How can
one reconcile its stringent demands with the medieval tortures of Hitler and
Stalin? Here we come back to the instructive case of McCarthyism. During
those years, two hundred men and women, at most, spent time in jail or a
detention center for what we might call political crimes, usually for no more
than one or two years, and the number of politically driven indictments and
convictions lies somewhere in the hundreds. 73 Simply put, the state's violence
during the McCarthy era was virtually nil, its levied punishments minimal.
And yet repressive fear was rampant.
Where then do the theorists of the rule of law go wrong? In their assumption that the "principal object" of political fear is to frighten men and
women "into impotence. 74 No regime, no matter how malignant, can afford
to create universal impotence among its subjects. Though some rulers might
harbor such fantasies, they still wish to see their subjects bow and scrape.
They still depend upon a secret police, which must effectively fulfill its duties, possess the most up-to-date instruments of rule, and work with collaborators throughout society. The economy must be maintained, if for no other
reason than to support the military against the threat of an invading army.
People must be clothed and fed, and social order preserved. Saddam Hussein,
explained one army officer after his fall, "could do many things to the people,
69.

ANNE APPLEBAUM, GULAG:

A HISTORY 122 (2003).

70. Id. at 124.
71. Id. at 125-26.

72. Id. at 122-27.
73.
74.

supra note 16, at 361-62, 532 n.8.
supra note 2, at 40.

SCHRECKER,

FULLER,
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..but while he could kill them, he could not afford to starve them. So yes,
he made sure the Ministry of Trade organized things correctly .... It helped

the regime maintain its legitimacy." 75 Tyrants don't always succeed in this;
indeed, some of them can pursue the most hair-brained schemes to modernize
their economies and societies. But that hardly means that they seek to create
an impotent society. What they seek is a politically repressed society, where
men and women perform only those tasks acceptable to the regime or not
prohibited by it and avoid the rest.
If we understand the consequence of political fear as suppression rather
than impotence, we can see how the wielders of fear can accommodate the
rule of law and even benefit from it. If nothing else, the rule of law offers a
patina of legitimacy to otherwise repressive acts of power. As Applebaum
reports of Stalin's Russia, "[u]ndoubtedly, the conviction that they were acting within the law was part of what motivated those working within the security services, as well as the guards and administrators who later controlled the
prisoners' lives in the camps." 76 But, again, McCarthyism offers the more
instructive example--of how not only the illusion but also the reality of legalism can support repressive fear. Though officials sometimes violated the rule
of law, what is most impressive about McCarthyism is just how often they
conformed to it. With time, legislators refined the target of their statutes,
gradually narrowing the range of actions deemed criminal. Pressed by liberalminded politicians and writers, successive pieces of legislation tightened the
circle of politically suspect activity and widened the sphere of legitimate activity. Over time, more procedural guarantees were provided to alleged subversives, as were more elaborate forms of judicial appeal. Courts, moreover,
proved increasingly willing to strike down legislation or government acts on
procedural grounds, claiming that officials were not acting in accordance with
established rules, and that individual rights were being threatened. And yet
fear flourished.
If we compare the three major pieces of federal anti-subversion legislation of the time-the Smith Act, 77 the Internal Security Act, 78 and the Com-

munist Control Act 7 9-we see how the rule of law simultaneously inspired a
gradual narrowing of the definition of criminal activity and aroused greater
fear. The Smith Act prohibited advocating or teaching "the duty, necessity,
desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the government of the
United States ...by force or violence" and printing, publishing, selling, or

distributing written materials to that effect.8 0 So did it criminalize organizing
or attempting to organize a group, or being a member of or affiliating with a
75. David Rieff, Were Sanctions Right? N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2003, § 6 (Magazine), at 41.
76. APPLEBAUM, supra note 69, at 122.
77. Alien Registration Act of 1940, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 808.
78. Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, ch. 1024, 64 Stat. 1010.
79. Communist Control Act of 1954, ch. 886, 68 Stat. 775.
80. 18 U.S.C. §2385; see also 1EMERSON ET AL., supra note 31, at 104-05.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss4/11

16

2004]

Robin: Robin: Fragmented State, Pluralist Society:
FRA GMENTED STA TE, PLURALIST SOCIETY

1077

group, performing any of these acts, as well as conspiracies of two or more
persons to advocate, write, or organize groups that advocated, wrote, and so
on. 81 (In 1949, the Justice Department invoked the Smith Act to prosecute the
Communist Party leadership in court-not for espionage or for attempting a
violent overthrow of the government, but for conspiring to organize a party to
advocate the violent overthrow of the government. The sheer number of
nouns and verbs the indictment required to link the defendants to an actual
crime-"conspiracy," "organize," "party," "advocate"-suggests just how far
removed the defendants were in this case from anything resembling criminal
activity.) Yet even the Smith Act, arguably the broadest and vaguest legislation of the era, put serious constraints on what the government could do. In
order to use it to prosecute the leadership of the Communist Party, Hoover,
the FBI, and the Justice Department were forced to amass mountains of evidence-nearly two thousand pages of party documents and testimony-that
the Party indeed advocated a revolutionary overthrow of the government by
force and violence.82 Hoover and the FBI had to work a full four years before
the Justice Department would even use the Smith Act to launch criminal
charges against the Party. The first Smith Act trial lasted ten months, one of
the longest in American history, 8 3 offering defendants ample time to rebut the
evidence presented against them. Tried and convicted, the leaders used their
rights of appeal all the way up to the Supreme Court.84 Once the Court ruled
against them, the government was able to prosecute only 129 of the Party's
lower-level leaders and members, of whom ninety-six were convicted.85 And
yet the fear these trials and prosecutions aroused in party members and fellow
travelers-coupled with the financial and emotion burden the trials imposed
6
on party leaders-helped to drain the party of its well of support.8
The 1950 Internal Security Act mandated that "any Communist-action
organization, Communist-front organization, or Communist-infiltrated organization" register with the Attorney General, and specified in great detail
what each of these terms meant.87 It created the Subversive Activities Control
Board, which, at the request of the Attorney General or other individuals,
could designate specific groups as "Communist-action," "Communist-front,"

81. 18 U.S.C. §2385; see also 1 EMERSON ET AL., supra note 31, at 104-05.
82. SCHRECKER, supra note 16, at 190-96.
83. Id. at 196-99.
84. Id. at 199-200; see also Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
85. 1 EMERSON ETAL., supra note 31, at 127.
86. See MICHAL R. BELKNAP, COLD WAR POLITICAL JUSTICE: THE SMITH

ACT,
THE COMMUNIST PARTY, AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 185-206 (1977); PETER L.
STEINBERG, THE GREAT "RED MENACE": UNITED STATES PROSECUTION OF AMERICAN

COMMUNISTS,

1947-1952, at 261-83 (1984).

87. Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, ch. 1024, §§ 3, 7-8, 64 Stat. 987,
989-91, 993-95; see also 1 EMERSON ET AL., supra note 31, at 160-65.
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or "Communist-infiltrated." 88 The bill was debated extensively in Congress,
received a full public hearing, and was vetoed by President Truman, whose
veto was overridden by Congress. s9 Even with all these procedural guarantees, the Internal Security Act was able to tar 197 left-wing groups as Communist and Communist-front organizations, the stigma90 of which was enough
to persuade many individuals to stay away from them.
The Communist Control Act, according to its liberal authors and sponsors, was designed to tighten the noose around the Communist Party and
loosen it around the rest of the progressive Left. 9 1 It was explicitly intended to
overcome what many liberals, chief among them Hubert Humphrey, thought
was the scatter-shot approach of the Internal Security Act. Max Kampelman,
one of Humphrey's top advisers, claimed that the bill's purpose was "to protect innocent people from being attacked ruthlessly and recklessly." 92 The
Communist Control Act thus made membership in the Communist Party a
specifiable crime, which meant that members and suspected members would
receive the full range of procedural protections guaranteed to criminal sus93
pects, and identified fourteen acts as evidence of possible membership.
Though Humphrey would later admit that the law was "not one of the things
I'm proudest of' and Kampelman would acknowledge that it did little to protect individual liberties, most liberals supported it as a significant advance
over its predecessors, prompting Michael Harrington to dismiss it as "an abject capitulation by liberalism to illiberalism." 94 The federal government seldom used the bill, though states and localities did invoke it to keep party
members
off election ballots and to deny unemployment claims to employ95
ees.

Equally impressive about each piece of legislation was how the government ensured that individuals and groups targeted by it enjoyed the right of
88. Subversive Activities Control Act § 12, 64 Stat. at 997; see also 1 EMERSON
supra note 31, at 165.
89. 1 EMERSON ET AL., supra note 31, at 169-70.

ETAL.,

90. Ellen Schrecker, McCarthyism and the Decline of American Communism,
1945-1960, in NEW STUDIES INTHE POLITICS AND CULTURE OF U.S. COMMUNISM 123

(Michael E. Brown et al. eds., 1993). For a list of the 197 organizations cited on the
Attorney General's list, see

ELLEN SCHRECKER, THE AGE OF MCCARTHYISM:

A BRIEF

HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 190-96 (2d ed. 2002).
91. MARY SPERLING MCAULIFFE, CRISIS ON THE LEFT: COLD WAR POLITICS AND
AMERICAN LIBERALS, 1947-1954, at 132-44 (1978); see also WILLIAM W. KELLER,
THE LIBERALS AND J. EDGAR HOOVER: RISE AND FALL OF A DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE
STATE 65-67 (1989).
92. MCAULIFFE, supra note 91, at 136.

93. Communist Control Act of 1954, ch. 886, §§ 4-5, 68 Stat. 775, 776-77; see
also MCAULIFFE, supra note 91, at 137-38.

94.

MCAULIFFE,

supra note 91, at 138-42.

95. See 1 EMERSON

ET AL.,

supra note 31, at 201;
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appeal. The initial Smith Act trial, as we have seen, was quite lengthy and
thorough, and its convictions were appealed all the way to the Supreme
Court. 96 (Interestingly, the two dissenters in that case, Justices Hugo Black
and William Douglas, did not argue against the majority on the grounds of the
rule of law, but on the basis of the First Amendment, indicating that a robust
conception of free speech offers a better defense against repressive legislation
than do procedural definitions of the rule of law.) 97 Its successor trials lasted
anywhere from three to six months, and were also appealed.98 In 1957, the
Supreme Court finally began overturning some of these lower level convictions as unconstitutional even though the individual cases were not markedly
different from that decided in the original one. 99 But by then, the damage had
already been done.
Under the Internal Security Act, the Subversive Activities Control Board
was careful not to tar all liberals or progressives as Communist. It established
and published detailed internal regulations-some eight to twelve criteria-to
guide and constrain its classification powers. 100 The Board required the Attorney General and the Communist Party to submit almost fifteen thousand
pages of testimony and 507 documents before rendering its decision to register the Party.' 0' Any individual or group claiming to have been improperly
classified by the Board had rights of judicial appeal-of which the Communist Party made extensive use-similar to those of suspected criminals. 0 2 The
appellate courts struck down two of the Board's individual findings about the
Party because the Board lacked sufficient evidence. 10 3 The Supreme Court
remanded the case on the grounds that the Party had not been given adequate
opportunity to rebut the testimony of individual witnesses. 1° 4- But when the
case finally came back to the Supreme Court-in 1961, after multiple appeals
and procedural reversals-the Court affirmed the Act's registration provision,
10 5
and the Board's decision to register the Communist Party, as constitutional.
96. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
97. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 579-91 (1951) (Black, J., and Douglas, J., dissenting).
98. 1 EMERSON ET AL., supra note 31, at 127.
99. See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), overruled by Burks v.
United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978); see also 1 EMERSON ET AL., supra note 31, at 12943.
100. Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, ch. 1024, § 13, 64 Stat. 987, 9981000; 1 EMERSON ET AL., supra note 31, at 166-67.
101. 1 EMERSON ET AL., supranote 31, at 172.
102. See id. at 172-73.
103. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 223 F.2d 531 (D.C.
Cir. 1954), rev'd, 351 U.S. 115 (1956); see also 1 EMERSON ET AL., supra note 31, at
172.
104. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 351 U.S. 115 (1956);
see also 1 EMERSON ET AL., supra note 31, at 172.
105. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
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The federal and state governments provided equally elaborate checks for
their loyalty and security employment programs, resulting in equally long
processes of appeal. 106 They also guaranteed individuals a fairly wide range
of rights similar to, though not as robust as, those granted to suspected criminals. Likewise, Congress provided procedural protections to committee witnesses. Even HUAC was compelled to establish, among other provisions, that
it could initiate investigations only with the approval of a majority of committee members (though "preliminary inquiries" could be conducted by committee staff, if the chair approved).10 7 Witnesses had the right to counsel and
were "invited" to consult with the committee's counsel or investigators "at
any time."'10 8 Individuals identified as subversives had to be notified by the
committee in writing that they had been named-where, when, and by
whom.' 0 9 They also had the right to request an appearance before the Committee to clear their names, and the committee
was required to provide them
10
with a written copy of its procedures.I
In each of these cases, many government officials and their supporters
sought to make sure that innocent persons were not punished, that even the
guilty would have the rights of appeal-without stopping to think much about
how they defined guilt (communism) and innocence (not just noncommunism but anti-communism) in the first place. They devoted extensive
resources to gathering information in order to pass reasonable legislation,
issue fair indictments, launch legitimate prosecutions, and reach truthful verdicts. They publicized their decision-making procedures and non-securitysensitive information, making for some level of government transparency.
Many cases, even those not of a criminal nature, consumed nearly ten years
of the courts' energy. At many points, the courts overturned government and
lower court decisions, though usually on procedural grounds and without
addressing the broader questions of free speech raised by these cases. And
yet, repression during the McCarthy era flourished, as did political fear. Not
the paralyzing fear imagined by theorists of the rule of law, but the repressive
fear that makes men and women careful about what they say and do, that
makes them draw back from dissident statements and insurgent movements. III
Analysts of McCarthyism sometimes claim that repressive fear succeeded because the rule of law failed, while others claim that repressive fear

106. See 1 EMERSON ET AL., supra note 31, at 340-422.; SCHRECKER, supra note
90, at 171-87; SCHRECKER, supra note 16, at 266-358.
107. House Committee on Un-American Activities Rules of Procedure, § 1, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), in 1 EMERSON ET AL., supra note 31, at 505-10.
108. Id. §§ 7, 10 n.4.
109. Id. § 10.
110. Id.
111. For an exhaustive inventory of fear under McCarthyism, see SCHRECKER,
supra note 16, at 359-415.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss4/11

20

2004]

Robin: Robin: Fragmented State, Pluralist Society:
FRAGMENTED STATE, PLURALIST SOCIETY

1081

failed because the rule of law succeeded.' 1 2 What neither camp seems willing
to entertain is the possibility that repressive fear and the rule of law both succeeded. Sometimes the first happened in spite of the second, other times-as
in the case of the liberal sponsorship of the Communist Control Act, or in the
years of appeals consuming the time, energy, and treasury of the Communist
Party-because of it.11 3 Ironically, it was one of the Supreme Court's more
conservative justices, Felix Frankfurter, who fully understood this relationship. Though he concurred with the majority in the Court's main Smith Act
case, Frankfurter reminded his colleagues and the nation that "constitutionality does not exact a sense of proportion or the sanity of humor or an absence
of fear."' 1 4 True, the federal government and the Court had made sure to apply the Smith Act only to the Communist Party. But there was no getting
around the fact that:
Suppressing advocates of overthrow inevitably will also silence
critics who do not advocate overthrow but fear that their criticism
may be so construed. No matter how clear we may be that the defendants now before us are preparing to overthrow our Government at the propitious moment, it is self-delusion to think that we
can punish them for their advocacy without adding to the risks run
by loyal citizens who honestly believe in some of the reforms these
15
defendants advance. 1
In the years that followed the Dennis decision, many reform-minded men and
women reacted just as Frankfurter predicted they would, withdrawing from
the political fray and insurgent movements. The rule of law proved too flimsy
a buffer against the repressive power hanging over them. Sometimes, it was
the repressive power hanging over them.

II. PLURALIST SOCIETY
In September 1954, the Fund for the Republic commissioned a team of
researchers and writers, including a young Michael Harrington, to investigate
blacklisting in the radio, television, and movie industries.l16 Like a hiker who
picks up a rock and finds a universe underneath, the team uncovered a world
of fear in the smallest of places. Perhaps the smallest was Counterattack,a
four-page weekly newsletter identifying Communists in the culture industries,
112. For the latter claim, see STANLEY I. KUTLER, THE AMERICAN INQUISITION:
JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE IN THE COLD WAR (1982).
113. For examples from the 1960s, see Churchill & Vander Wall, supra note 56,
at 143, 183-84.
114. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 556 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
115. Id. at 549 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
116. 2 JOHN COGLEY,

REPORT ON BLACKLISTING: RADIO- TELEVISION v-x

(1956).
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which the networks used to make decisions about hiring and firing. 1 7 The
editors of Counterattack had once worked for the FBI but left after deciding
that "the efforts of our government to combat Communist activities have
failed to eliminate the effectiveness of this 5th column.""18 Convinced they
could do more outside the government, they formed a non-profit consulting
practice, John Quincy Adams Associates, to expose the Party and its allies.19
When the enterprise failed, they established a for-profit company, with private funding from wealthy anti-communists.' 20 The firm took off. Its most
successful publication was a special report, Red Channels, which cited 151
men and women associated with "Communist causes" working in television
and radio. 121 Virtually all of these iniiul
individuals wr122
were blacklisted. So frequently was Red Channels consulted by network executives, corporate sponsors, and
advertising agencies that it was called "the Bible of Madison Ave23
nue."1
What connected this rogue outfit of FBI dropouts to New York's striped
shirts? A Syracuse grocer by the name of Laurence Johnson. Owner of an
upstate supermarket chain, Johnson was a leader in civic affairs and a fervent
anti-communist.124 Whenever a company sponsored a radio or television program involving someone cited in Red Channels, Johnson threatened to post
notices above its products in his stores, informing customers that the company funded "subversives. ' ' t25 He conscripted fellow supermarket owners to
do the same, mobilized customers to send letters of complaint, and made personal visits to industry executives. 126 According to the Fund, Johnson "not
only lends credence to the 'economic' argument for blacklisting; generally
speaking, he is the argument."' 2 7 So powerful was the combined force of Red
Channels and Johnson that one talent agent in the radio industry claimed, "I
never hear about the FBI or the Attorney General-all I ever hear about is
Red Channels and this Johnson of Syracuse
and the other characters who
128
have made a business out of this thing."'
Repressive fear in America is often like that: the state hovers in the
background while civil society looms large. Though its advocates disagree
about its definition, civil society generally refers to those social institutions
and organizations not explicitly part of the government. These can range from
117. Id. at 1-4.

118. Id. at3 &n.*.
119. Id. at 3 n.*.

120. Id.

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 1.
Id. at 1-2.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 100-01.
Id. at 101.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 171.
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family and neighborhood groups to the church and the Rotary Club to political parties and labor unions to corporations and the workplace.' 29 Most, if not
all, of civil society has some connection to the state, but a significant portion
of its activity usually transpires outside of government. In theory, that is what
makes civil society a source of freedom. Because it lies outside the govemment, men and women can carry on their activities there without fear of government coercion. To the extent that this activity is political, civil society is
supposed to offer opportunities for mobilization through moral suasion, not
force. To the extent that the activity is not political, civil society offers a balance to the oppressive demands of politics. If we are involved in churches,
synagogues, and mosques, if we spend four nights out of the week at home
with our families and the other three nights bowling in leagues, politics cannot claim the whole of our lives. Though Madison never spoke of civil society, it fulfills his dictum that diversity is a source of freedom. "[B]y comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens," pluralism
can "render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improb30
able."'
That is the theory. The practice is altogether different. Civil society,
even in the most liberal polities, is often a supplement to state repression or a
repressive agent in its own right.' 31 Particularly in liberal democracies, where
129. Some theorists define civil society as a "third way" between or beyond the
state and the market. Given the intimate involvement of civil society in the market from the Catholic Church's real estate holdings to labor unions to civic associations
like the Chamber of Commerce; virtually all of these organizations, it should be
pointed out, are also employers - I see no basis for this definition. If we equate civil
society solely with voluntary, non-economic associations, with minimal to no involvement in the market, we would have to exclude universities, professional associations, religious institutions, political parties, social movements, the family, and many
other organizations, leaving us with little more than the PTA, the Rotary Club, and the
Jaycees.
130. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 321 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed.,
1987).
131. Contemporary advocates of civil society are not blind to its oppressive dimensions, but they conceive of these oppressions along a distinctive axis. In Robert
Putnam's formulation, what distinguishes positive and negative "social capital" is
whether it "bridges" or "bonds." ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE
COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY

22-24, 350-63 (2000). Bonding

organizations connect us to people like us, bridging organizations to people who are
different. Id. While bonding organizations have their benign or useful qualities, the
specter of exclusion, intolerance, and hatred of outsiders always hangs over them. Id.
We cannot eliminate bonding organizations, nor would we wish to. Id. But we must
make sure, to the extent that we can, that they educate citizens in the values of tolerance and mutual accommodation, not narrow group identities and exclusion. Id. For
theorists of civil society, in other words, trouble in civil society tracks issues of identity and membership, who is included and excluded, not repression and fear. See id.;
see also Amy Gutmann, Freedom ofAssociation: An IntroductoryEssay, in FREEDOM
OF ASSOCIATION 3 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1998).
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state power is limited, elites have every incentive to use civil society to promote fear. Though this is hardly a hard and fast rule, we may surmise that the
more liberal a government becomes, the more attractive an instrument of fear
civil society will seem. Consider the following statistics. In the Red Scare of
1919-20, the American government put some ten thousand men and women
into jails and detention centers and deported about six hundred. 132 During the
McCarthy years, by contrast, liberal limitations upon the state ensured that no
more than two hundred people spent time behind bars, and only a very few
were deported. Yet McCarthyism lasted longer, affected more individuals,
inflicted more permanent damage, and was in the long run a greater influence
on American politics. Why? Many factors were at work-not least of which,
the Cold War-but one of them was the greater involvement of civil society,
particularly the workplace, during McCarthyism. For though the government
directly penalized only a small number of individuals, anywhere from one to
two of33every five American workers was subject to a loyalty investigation at
1
work.

There is little mystery as to why civil society can serve as a substitute or
supplement to state repression. Civil society is not, on the whole, subject to
restrictions like the Bill of Rights. What the state is forbidden to do, private
actors in civil society may do instead. "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation," Justice Jackson famously declared, "it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word
or act their faith therein."'' 34 But what star in our constitutional constellation
forbids newspapers like The New York Times, which refused during the
McCarthy years to hire members of the Communist Party, 135 from prescribing such orthodoxy as a condition of employment? What in the Constitution
would stop a publisher from telling poet Langston Hughes that it would not
issue his Famous Negro Music Makers unless he removed any discussion of
Communist singer Paul Robeson? 136 Or stop Little, Brown from refusing to
publish best-selling Communist author Howard Fast? 137 The Sixth Amendment guarantees "[i]n all criminal prosecutions" that the accused shall "have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."' 38 But what in the Constitution
would prevent attorney Abe Fortas, who would later serve on the Supreme
132. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note

1, at 156, 160;

ROBERT

K. MURRAY,

RED SCARE:

A

STUDY IN NATIONAL HYSTERIA, 1919-1920, at 251 (1955); WILLIAM PRESTON, JR.,
ALIENS AND DISSENTERS: FEDERAL SUPPRESSION OF RADICALS, 1903-1933, at 221

(1963).
133.

BROWN, JR., supra note 48, at 181; GRIFFIN FARIELLO, RED SCARE:
MEMORIES OF THE AMERICAN INQUISITION, AN ORAL HISTORY 42 (1995).

134. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
135. BROWN, JR., supra note 48, at 147.
136. SCHRECKER, supra note 16,
137. BROWN, JR., supra note 48,
138. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

at 397.
at 149.
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Court, from refusing to represent a Party member during the McCarthy years
because, in his words, "We have decided... that we don't think we can ever
afford to represent anybody that has ever been a Communist"?' 39 The Fifth
Amendment stipulates that the government cannot compel an individual to
incriminate herself, 140 but it does not forbid private employers from firing
anyone invoking its protections before congressional committees. 14' To the
extent that our Constitution works against an intrusive state, how can it even
authorize the government to regulate these private decisions of civil society?
What the liberal state granteth, then, an illiberal civil society can taketh away.
Ironically, the very features of civil society that advocates presume to be
its chief virtues-its pluralism, autonomy, and intimacy-often make it conducive to repressive fear. Like the federalist division of power, the pluralism
and diversity of civil society creates more opportunities for men and women
to participate in repression. One report from a New York public relations
officer, whose specialty was to "clear" blacklisted employees of any suspicion so that they could work in television or radio, captures the connection
between a diverse civil society and political repression. I quote it in full, for
its very length suggests just how many players, institutions, and interests can
be involved in repression. Reading like a parody of Montesquieu, The Federalist Papers, and Tocqueville, it invokes checks and balances, procedural
justice, and interest group pluralism. It shows that diversity makes repression
not less toxic but more baroque, requiring occasion after occasion of abject
display and political submission.
"If a man is clean and finds his way to me the first thing I do is
examine his record. I look particularly to see if it includes charges
that he is a member of the Communist Party. I want to find out if
he is 'clearable.' Once I am convinced that he is not a Communist,
or if he has been a Communist, has had a change of heart, I ask
him whether he has talked to the FBI. If he hasn't, I tell him the
first thing he must do is go to the FBI and tell them everything he
knows. I tell him to say to them, 'I am a patriotic citizen and I want
you to ask me any questions you have in mind.'
"Then I find out where he is being blacklisted-where it is he
can't get work, who in the industry is keeping him from working,
and who outside the industry has made him controversial. If, for
instance, I find it is the American Legion, I call one of the top Legion officials and tell him this man has come to me for help and
139.

SCHRECKER,

supra note 16, at 303. See also JEROLD S. AUERBACH,

UNEQUAL

JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 231-62
BROWN, JR., supra note 48, at 109-16; KUTLER, supra note 112, at 152-82.

(1976);

140. U.S. CONST. amend V.
141. BROWN, JR., supra note 48, at 130, 136, 146-48.
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says he is innocent. The official may say to me, 'Why this guy has
47 listings and I know people who say they don't believe him.' But
I say, 'I'm going to have him make a statement.' Then, when the
Legion guy gets the statement and has read it, I call and ask him
for a note saying he is satisfied by the statement. He will usually
say, 'I won't put anything in writing but if anyone is interested
have him call me.'
"Somewhere along the line I may find George Sokolsky [a conservative journalist whose columns regularly charged or cleared
individuals of being Communists] is involved. I go to him and tell
him that the Legion official thinks this boy is all right. If I can convince Sokolsky then I go to Victor Reisel, Fred Woltman [also
journalists] or whoever else is involved. When I've gotten four 'affidavits' from key people like these, I go to Jack Wren at BBD&O
[New York advertising agency Batten, Barton, Durstine and
Osborn] and to the 'security officer' at CBS.
"I wait a few days, then I telephone Wren. He may say to me,
'You're crazy. I know 15 things this guy hasn't explained.' So I
send for the guy. He comes in here and he moans and wails and
beats his head against the wall. 'I have searched my memory,' he
will say. 'I have questioned my wife and my agent. There's not a
thing they can remember.'
"I call Wren back and he says, 'When your boy is ready to come
clean I'll talk to him.' In that case we've reached a dead end. My
boy has been cleared but he can't get a job. I know cases where
victims have sat around eight to ten months after 'clearance' before
they got work."

"Last of all ... there is the possibility that Wren will pick up the
phone and call a casting director or producer and say, 'Why don't
you give Bill a part in the show?...'

"A guy who is in trouble, even if he has a good case for himself,
will stay dead unless he finds someone like me who can lead him
through the jungle of people who have to be satisfied. He has to
persuade these people one by one. Usually he finds his way to a
lawyer and that comes a cropper, or he finds a public-relations man
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or press agent who doesn't have the confidence
of the 'clearance
' 42
men,' and he's only wasting his time."'
And this, we should recall, is how the "innocent" are treated.
Diversity in civil society also makes for factional divisions among the
very forces that might challenge repression. In Federalist10, Madison argued
that factions should be encouraged as an antidote to government tyranny; the
more factions, he argued, the less able they would be to organize the government on their tyrannical behalf 1 43 Two centuries later, J. Edgar Hoover brilliantly exploited Madison's prescription in order to foster goverment repression. During the 1960s, the FBI stoked division among civil rights organizations, the student Left, and other progressive organizations. It did not create
these divisions-they were already there-but it exacerbated them. In a secret
1967 memo sent to twenty-two field offices throughout the country, the FBI
issued the following instructions:
Efforts of the various groups [in the black liberation movement] to
consolidate their forces or to recruit new or youthful adherents
must be frustrated. No opportunity should be missed to exploit
through counterintelligence techniques the organizational and personal conflicts of the leaderships of the groups and where possible
an effort should be made to capitalize upon existing conflicts between competing black nationalist organizations.a4
A year later, the FBI sent out another memo, instructing its field offices to
[p]revent the coalition of militant black nationalist groups. In unity
there is strength; a truism that is no less valid for all its triteness.
An effective coalition of black nationalist groups might be the first
step toward a real "Mau Mau" in America, the beginning of a true
black revolution.145
The FBI disrupted efforts by the Black Panthers to form multicultural coalitions among Puerto Rican organizations, white urban gangs, and the student
movement, encouraging the militant separatism for which the Panthers and
other practitioners of identity politics would later be criticized. 46 The FBI
also tried to use the women's movement, which it saw as a "divisive and fac142.
143.

COGLEY, supra note 116, at
THE FEDERALIST No. 10,

89-9 1.
at 127 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed.,

1987).
144. Churchill & Vander Wall, supra note 56, at 92-93.
145. Id.at 109-11; see also id.
at 114, 120, 125.
146. Id.at 138-39; see also id.
at 103.
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tionalizing147
factor," as a way "to weaken the revolutionary movement" and the
New Left.
In the same way that the desire of officeholders like Truman to maintain
the autonomy of their branch of government can lead them to cooperate rather
than resist repression, so does a desire among elites in civil society to maintain the autonomy of their institutions inspire a willingness to cooperate with
repressive forces. During the Cold War, leaders of civil society-university
presidents, newspaper publishers, corporate magnates, and leaders of private
associations-often initiated or agreed to implement repressive programs in
their own institutions, if for no other reason than to keep the government and
private blacklisters at bay. The president of Barnard College announced, "If
the colleges take the responsibility to do their own house cleaning, Congress
would not feel it has to investigate." ' 148 One HUAC investigator told the press
that he intended to explicitly prey upon this concern when he spoke with Hollywood's studio heads. "I plan to hold a number of meetings with industry
heads, and the full resources of the House Committee and our investigative
staff are at the disposal of those ... who want to put their house in order before Congress does it for them." 149 Irving Ferman of the ACLU claimed that
he worked with the FBI in order to protect his organization from an investigation by HUAC and the American Legion.1 50 Likewise the NAACP, which
collected files on its entire membership, purged those deemed to be Party
members, even its founder W.E.B. DuBois, who worked closely with the
Communist Party and ultimately joined it late in life.' 51
What also makes civil society useful for repression and fear is that it is a
sphere of intimacy and mutual trust. While individuals look upon politicians
and state officials with suspicion, civil society is home to our friends and
families, priests and rabbis, neighbors and colleagues. Even in the workplace
or economy, civil society is populated by men and women we know well:
front-line supervisors who live next door or marry our siblings, small business owners with a common touch, wealthy entrepreneurs who only yesterday
worked beside us. When these familiars encourage us to capitulate to fear or
when they themselves act repressively, we trust that their advice and actions
are not impersonal dictates of the state but well meaning words and deeds of
people who care about us or who are like us. This kind of intimacy supposedly holds a community together in the face of a predatory state. But what it

147. Ruth Rosen, When Women Spied on Women,

THE NATION,

Sept. 4/11, 2000,

at 18.
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150.
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fear from a state-run enterprise into a
can also do is transform repressive
152
more personal affair of the heart.
The specific mechanisms that individuals and institutions in civil society
use to create fear include workplace sanctions, the orchestration of a social
consensus on behalf of repression, the mobilization of civic groups to boycott
stigmatized products, the suggestion by influential private elites that individuals submit to fear, and informers.153 But two other mechanismsostracism and rumormongering-are worth discussing. Ostracism, we are
often told, is the democrat's weapon of choice, for in a democracy, the rejection of the crowd is supposed to be the most difficult burden to bear. According to Emerson:
Yet is the discontent of the multitude more formidable than that of
the senate and the college. It is easy enough for a firm man who
knows the world to brook the rage of the cultivated classes. Their
rage is decorous and prudent, for they are timid, as being very vulnerable themselves. But when to their feminine rage the indignation of the people is added, when the ignorant and the poor are
aroused, when the unintelligent brute force that lies at the bottom
of society is made to growl and mow, it needs the habit of magnanimity 54and religion to treat it godlike as a trifle of no concernment. 1
Ostracism, in this view, is the work of small town majorities, of narrowminded men and women with nothing better to do than poke their noses in
other people's affairs. Their chief goal is to reinforce popular tastes and sensibilities, and their target is the lonely genius defended by John Stuart Mill in
On Liberty. In truth, ostracism is often the work of organized groups and influential elites in civil society. With the help of organizations like the American Legion or publications like Counterattack,elites form broad coalitions to
disseminate both information about dissenting individuals and specific instructions to target them. These coalitions prey not upon the craven desire of
the democratic individual to belong, but upon the activist's political need for
comrades. Isolating the dissenter, they surround her with a stigma, making it
difficult for her to mobilize a movement. In the words of Counterattack:
The way to treat Communists is to ostracize them. How would
you act towards men [and women] who had been convicted of trea152. I develop this theme at greater length in my FEAR: THE HISTORY OF A
chs. 2, 6 (2004).
153. See id. at ch. 6. On informers in the United States, see O'REILLY, supra note
150, at 83-88, 173-89; NORA SAYRE, RUNNING TIME: FILMS OF THE COLD WAR 12-13

POLITICAL IDEA

(1982);

SCHRECKER, supra note 16, at 107, 228; Rosen, supra note 147.
154. RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Self-Reliance, in ESSAYS: FIRST AND SECOND

SERIES 47, 57 (1883).
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son? Would you befriend them, invite them [sic], listen to them?
Or would you treat them as outcasts?
Total ostracism ... that's the only effective way. It's the only
way to freeze the Communists out. It's the only DEED that will
prove you believe what you say about them. And so it's the most
convincing propaganda.155
As Counterattack indicates, ostracism can be a substitute for penalties of
state. But it can also supplement those penalties. In 1949, for example,
screenwriter Alvah Bessie, out of work and facing mounting bills (he had
refused to testify before HUAC and was blacklisted), approached his longtime friend, actor Lee J. Cobb, for a $500 loan.'5 6 Cobb, who would go on to
immortalize the character of Willy Loman in Arthur Miller's Death of a
Salesman, had a full studio contract at the time, but he also had a radical past
as a Party member. I1 7 Cobb was nervous about helping a friend cited for contempt of Congress and on his way to jail. Bessie begged him for the loan, but
Cobb refused.158 He gently escorted Bessie to the door, telling him, "You're a
revolutionary, you know. Go on being a revolutionary. Go on being an example to me."1 59 Such ostracism supplements the penalties of state and civil
society, demonstrating how social snubs and stigmas track the acts of repressive elite power rather than those of democratic majorities.
It was Joseph de Maistre, France's preeminent theorist of counterrevolution, who first explained how rumors could crush a revolution and restore the
old regime.160 A cabal of counterrevolutionaries, he wrote in 1797, dispatches
couriers to the provinces announcing that the king has taken back his
throne.' 6' Then "[r]umour takes the news and adds a thousand impressive
details."' 62 Defenders of the revolution are confused, uncertain whether the
news is true. The cabal circulates more disinformation, preying upon the
63
revolutionaries' confusion and their distrust of each other and their leaders.1
While this would seem thin gruel for anything as grand as a counterrevolution, Maistre believed it was all that was required for the return of the old
regime. With everyone in the revolution suspicious of everyone else, "pru-

155.

COGLEY,

supra note 116, at 12 (quoting Counterattack 1947) (alteration in

original).
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dence inhibits audacity."' 4 Knowing that their opponents are saddled with
indecision, the counterrevolution swoops into the capital and takes back the
throne. "Citizens!" Maistre proclaimed. "This is how counter-revolutions are
made."' 65 "Four or five persons," he prophesied, "will give France a king."'' 6
It's highly improbable that J. Edgar Hoover ever read Maistre; he didn't
have to. Hoover understood, almost intuitively, how rumors circulated within
civil society could immobilize movements of radicalism and reform, particularly if those rumors were specially crafted to appeal to the particular values
of different groups. Rumors had to be differently tailored to members of the
movement, their parents and families, or the movement's liberal allies.
"[C]areful attention must be given," explained a 1967 FBI memo, "to insure
the targeted group is disrupted, ridiculed, or discredited through the publicity
and not merely publicized." 161 Within the civil rights movement, the FBI
circulated rumors, some of them true, of Martin Luther King's extramarital
affairs. 168 When those rumors failed to turn his followers against him and
King was awarded the Nobel Prize, the Bureau made a tape allegedly proving
that King had been involved in "'orgiastic' trysts with prostitutes" and decried "the depths of his sexual perversion and depravity."' 169 It threatened to
send the tape to the media unless King committed suicide before he received
the Prize, and it unsuccessfully attempted to have Benjamin Bradlee, then
Washington bureau chief at Newsweek, publish its contents. 170 In Oakland,
the Bureau supplied a steady stream of rumors to the Bay Area press about
the fancy apartments owned by leaders of the Black Panthers, their alleged
venereal disease, and affairs with teenage girls. 171 The Bureau sought to sever
the links between black radicals in New York and prominent liberals by cirAmong
culating accusations of black anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism.
more radical groups, especially in the counterculture, rumors of sexual promiscuity had little force. So the Bureau relied on something it called "badjacketing," where student leaders like Tom Hayden or black militants like
Stokely Carmichael were accused of being government informants. 173 "One
method" of circulating rumors about Carmichael, according to a 1968 memo,
would be to have a carbon copy of an informant report supposedly
written by CARMICHAEL to the CIA carefully deposited in the
automobile of a close Black Nationalist friend .... It is hoped that
164. Id. at 79.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 77.
167. Churchill & Vander Wall, supra note 56, at 92-93.
168. Id. at 97.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 146.
172. Id. at 135-37.
173. Id. at 126, 181-82.
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when the informant report is read it will help promote distrust between CARMICHAEL and the Black Community .... It is hoped
the rumor in various large Negro
that the informants would spread
74
communities across the land. 1
And when all else failed, the FBI could prey upon the homophobia within
accusations that individual leadthese movements and the nation, circulating
75
ers were involved in same-sex affairs.1
III. LIBERALISM AGONISTES
Our perennial misunderstanding of repressive fear in the United States
has much to do with the schizophrenic qualities of American liberalism. Politically repressive fear has been both the doing and undoing of American
liberalism, but few of our writers seem willing to acknowledge-or able to
recognize-this fact. Drawing on Montesquieu and Tocqueville, intellectuals
possess a liberal diagnosis of political fear and a liberal prescription for its
cure. Political fear, they argue, is caused by a centralized, lawless state pulverizing civil society into atomized dust, to which the Constitution is supposed to provide the perfect antidote: separation of powers, federalism, and
the rule of law. Though neither the free market nor a pluralist society is mentioned in the Constitution, they are often invoked as prescriptions against
fear, reflecting the vision, formulated by Madison, of a complex freedom
growing between the cracks of a richly textured society. If political fear does
arise in the United States, leading writers claim that it cannot be the result or
even unanticipated side effect of these liberal remedies. It must emerge from
outside the fragmented state or from some forgotten outpost of civil society.
That is the theory. The practice, as we have seen, is altogether different
for political fear in the United States has been both the fulfillment and betrayal of liberalism, in ways that few writers realize. American liberalism is a
double-edged sword--on the one hand, promising and sometimes delivering a
society of free and equal men and women, on the other hand, defending a set
of arrangements, like the fragmented state and social pluralism, that routinely
betray that promise. At its best, liberalism has liberated slaves from bondage
and second-class citizens from Jim Crow, given women the vote and workers
the right to unionize, and generally made the United States a more humane
society. But with its suspicion of strong, centralized states, its wariness of
social movements that seek to overcome the enervating pluralism of American life, and its commitment to moderation, liberalism has also lent support to
the forces of fear. As Martin Luther King noted in 1963:

174. Id. at 126.

175. Id. at 185-86.
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I have almost reached the regrettable conclusion that the Negro's
great stumbling block in the stride toward freedom is not the White
Citizen's Counciler or the Ku Klux Klanner, but the white moderate who is more devoted to "order" than to justice; who prefers a
negative peace which is the absence of tension to a positive peace
which is the presence of justice; who constantly says, "I agree with
you in the goal you seek, but I can't agree with your methods of direct action ....,176
Reckoning with American political fear demands a more honest account
of liberalism's contradictory inheritance and a greater skepticism toward
some of its dearest faiths. I say this neither to discredit liberalism nor to recommend that we discard it. The protections it affords are real and not to be
dismissed. A meditation on this doubleness of American life, in which liberalism and fear are so closely tethered, need not be taken as a sign of illiberalism. It is instead, it seems to me, the merest prerequisite of maturity, of the
wisdom that should come to a nation after several centuries of constitutional
rule.

176. Martin Luther King, Jr., Letterfrom Birmingham City Jail, in A
OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

TESTAMENT

289, 295 (James

Melvin Washington ed., 1986).
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